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Introduction 
Model organisms are usually defined as non-human species that are extensively studied in 
order to understand a range of biological phenomena, with the hope that data, models and 
theories generated will be applicable to other organisms, particularly those that are in some 
way more complex than the original. The selective use of organisms has been critical in 
biology for centuries, as underscored by the commonly cited August Krogh principle: ‘For a 
large number of problems, there will be some animal of choice, or a few such animals on 
which it can most conveniently be studied’ [1]. In many cases, the selection of particular 
organisms was fortuitous rather than carefully planned, as the organisms were already in use 
or familiar to the researchers, and some of their advantageous features only emerged in 
retrospect [2-4]. The most widely acknowledged inventory of model organisms, compiled by 
the U.S. National Institute of Health, comprises only thirteen species, including the yeast 
Saccharomyces cerevisiae, the fruitfly Drosophila melanogaster, the nematode worm 
Caenorhabditis elegans, the plant Arabidopsis thaliana, the zebrafish Danio rerio and the 
mouse Mus musculus [5]. Yet, since the advent of the large-scale genomic sequencing 
projects, the term “model organism” has become ubiquitous in biological discourse, and is 
increasingly used to describe any experimental organism utilised to investigate a particular 
biological process or system. Examples of this tendency include recent laboratory manuals on 
“emerging” model organisms ranging from honeybee to wallaby [6]. Many research groups 
are experiencing pressures as a result of the popularity of the term, for instance due to 
competitive granting systems that force researchers to focus on these organisms or to 
rationalise proposed research work on a particular organism by claiming that it is, in some 
sense, a “model organism” [7, 8]. The model organism concept has thus been accused of 
“swamping out” research agendas, making it difficult to get funding to do research on non-
model organisms [9]. Critics also questioned the scientific validity of model organisms as 
research tools, pointing out that their use emphasises unity across life instead of exploring 
diversity, and genetics over all other organismal features or levels of analysis [10]. These 
critiques are largely justified, yet fail to recognise the important role as reference points that 
model organisms have acquired in contemporary biological research, the complex factors that 
have led them to have this status, and the implications for research and funding. This 
commentary proposes a view of model organisms that explains their key role within 
contemporary large-scale biological research, while at the same time acknowledging their 
limitations as biological models.  
 
From experimental to model organisms 
The list of organisms deemed to be well-suited for research purposes includes hundreds of 
species, such as for instance the sea urchin for development; Planaria for inheritance; 
Chlamydomonas reinhardtii for photosynthesis; Dictyostelium discoideum for cellular 
differentiation/communication; Aplysia for neurobiology; the dog for physiology and 
haematology; the mouse in fields ranging from physiology to immunology and oncology; and 
the rat in nutrition, neurology and behavioural psychology (e.g. [11,12]). What we wish to 
contend here is that not all of these organisms have played the same role within experimental 
research. In particular, not all experimental organisms have become model organisms.
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Experimental organisms do not necessarily have to be representative of species other than 
themselves. They are studied either as (1) a means to investigate a specific phenomenon or as 
(2) interesting organisms in and of themselves. Prominent early examples of (1) include the 
frog and the guinea pig. Dating back to the late 1600s, the frog was used to study muscle 
action, circulation and respiration because it was considered a highly experimentally tractable 
and accessible animal [13]. The guinea pig was first adopted to investigate anatomical 
structures, and later for the establishment of the germ theory, the discovery of vitamin C and 
vaccines, and in toxicology [14,15]. Both organisms were chosen because they had 
characteristics relevant to studying a particular process or disease (for example, guinea pigs, 
unlike pigeons, acquire scurvy-like diseases when subjected to particular types of diet). A 
clear example of (2) is the study of malaria plasmodium and its mosquito carrier, which are 
extensively researched primarily because of the threat they pose to humans rather than 
because they provide experimental access to specific phenomena (though of course such 
organisms do function as models for processes such as the lifecycle of parasites). 
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 As we make clear below, the categories of ‘experimental’ and ‘model’ organisms can and 
indeed often morphed or evolved over time. Our distinction thus is not meant to apply 
universally and atemporally, but rather can be used to identify and evaluate specific moments 
of the history of the use of an organism in biological research.   
Model organisms, such as the ones listed by the NIH, have different key characteristics. First, 
they are always taken to represent a larger group of organisms beyond themselves, and serve 
as the basis for articulating processes thought to be shared across several (or all) other types 
of organism, particularly those processes whose molecular bases can be articulated. Because 
of their use in the human genome projects and biomedical research, model organisms are 
often claimed to be representative of processes that it is hoped will be shared by higher level 
organisms, especially human beings. These organisms are not being studied primarily 
because they are interesting in their own right (though they may well be) but because of the 
value they can have for investigating processes that can be generalised: ‘the fish is a frog…is 
a chicken…is a mouse’ [16]. 
Second, model organisms are selected and used to study whole, intact organisms, in other 
words as models for a range of systems and processes that occur in living organisms, 
including genetics, development, physiology, evolution and ecology. This approach allows 
pursuit of one key, long-term goal of this type of research: that of promoting large-scale, 
comparative work across species by integrating a range of disciplinary approaches. This goal 
is achieved using a specific strategy, which is first to gather resources and build 
interdisciplinary infrastructure on individual organisms, and then to compare across species 
using the original organism as a reference point [17]. So for instance, as is well-known, a 
number of homologous genes have been identified across a range of model organisms, 
although of course questions remain in many cases about the correlation between sequence 
and function. Nonetheless researchers conceptualise identification of these homologues as a 
key step in producing knowledge about the molecular basis of phenotypes, particularly of 
variations that cause disease (e.g., the gene BRCA1 whose homologue has variant forms in C. 
elegans and the mouse), and also for gathering information about the evolutionary histories of 
these organisms, particularly speciation. 
Third, model organisms have experimental characteristics that closely relate to their power as 
genetic tools: small physical and genomic sizes; low costs to breed, maintain and transport; 
short generation times and life cycles; high fertility rates; and high mutation rates or high 
susceptibility to techniques for genetic modification. Indeed, model organisms have been 
developed using complex processes of standardisation that allow the establishment of one or 
more strains which then serve as the basis of future research. The standard strain, 
paradoxically referred to as “wild type,” is a token organism developed through various 
laboratory techniques so that it possesses features valued by researchers and can be 
reproduced with the least possible variability across generations, for example through cloning 
[18,19]. Processes of genetic standardisation are essential because model organism research 
hinges on developing a detailed genetic account of the organism; this characteristic is not an 
“in principle” requirement, but rather one derived from the historical context in which this 
type of research developed. In contrast, standardisation is not a defining, generic feature of 
experimental organisms: how standardised the organism is (in genetic or other terms) is a 
function of the question under investigation, and has considerable epistemological 
consequences especially with regard to the translation of results from model organisms more 
generally and especially to humans [20].  
 
Infrastructure is critical 
The material features necessary for pursuing integrative research on model organisms may 
arise casually, but they require the establishment and maintenance of a range of 
infrastructures enabling cross-disciplinary communication and the exchange of standardised 
materials and instruments, as well as specific social structures for the models to retain their 
scientific value. Model organism research has depended critically on building infrastructure, 
including stock/strain centres and cyberinfrastructure such as databases for communication of 
results. Hence another essential feature which contributes to the characterisation of a model 
organism is the distinct infrastructure that surrounds these organisms. The value of model 
organism research was clearly recognised by granting bodies in the 1980s, leading to the 
awarding of large-scale funding to the genome sequencing projects in the 1990s, as well as 
“community resources” such as stock centres (e.g., C. elegans and Arabidopsis) and 
community databases such as Flybase, The Arabidopsis Information Resource (TAIR), and 
WormBase. This infrastructure contributed significantly to these communities’ abilities to 
foster communication and collaboration, and hence to conduct their research efficiently and 
effectively. Due to their capacities for bringing results, people and specimens together, 
community databases and stock centres have come to played crucial roles in defining what 
counts as knowledge of organisms in the post-genomic era [21, 22]. 
 
The community ethos 
There are three additional distinctions about what makes something a model organism. First, 
research groups who use various organisms do not tend to have strong social ties simply 
because they work on the same organism, unlike those who work with model organisms 
where there are relatively delimited and unified research communities. Second, the explicit 
and implicit rules that govern work with model organisms are better articulated (particularly 
for publicly-funded research) than in other areas of biology. These communities have a strong 
ethos of sharing resource materials, techniques and data, and of making materials and data 
available across the community almost immediately. The communities associated with 
particular model organisms thus have become models for certain behaviours within science, 
described as the “share and survive” ethos [23]. Finally, those who participate actively in 
model organism communities are expected to contribute material to the stock centres, support 
the community databases by providing data and other information, and perhaps even assist in 
database curation, in exchange for being critically dependent on the specialised information 
and resources available through the community. Hence the material practices of model 
organism research are defined much more closely than those associated with experimental 
organism research. Creating a model organism is itself a powerful incentive for research 
communities to adopt norms of reciprocal sharing and investment in communal 
infrastructure. Thus, what constitutes a model organism is itself determined, at least in part, 
by the social norms established and fostered by the research communities involved (which of 
course depend in turn on the broader infrastructures, funding strategies and policy mandates 
within which these communities are located). 
 
Conclusion 
We have argued that there is something special about model organisms compared to 
experimental organisms more generally: model organisms are understood as representing a 
larger group of organisms beyond themselves, often by functioning as genetic models for 
fundamental processes of interest; they serve as models for whole, intact organisms, in other 
words for a range of systems and processes which occur in living organisms, and hence 
support large-scale, comparative work, by members of a well-defined community, across 
species integrating a range of disciplinary approaches.  
Currently there is inadequate understanding among researchers, science administrators or 
historians/philosophers of science about the implications of using the term “model organism” 
and the deep epistemic and other commitments that necessarily accompany it. By invoking 
and analysing the term, we do not intend to endorse the idea that integrative, comparative 
research necessarily needs to start with strict focus on individual organisms and gathering 
resources on a massive scale. Instead, we are arguing that we need to understand the 
epistemic and social characteristics of this form of “big science,” given this idea has already 
been implemented on a wide scale by scientists and science administrators.  In order to make 
wise use of existing resources, researchers now find themselves committed to carrying out 
this specific, long-term vision about the “right way” to do biological research, with its 
accompanying assumptions. Our aim is to provide clarity to recent debates around the claim 
that too much funding has been invested in the best-established model organisms (e.g., [24]) 
through our arguments regarding the appropriate characterisation of the key features of model 
organisms. 
As pointed out by model organism researchers and other commentators [25], sudden cuts of 
funding for model organism research would run counter to its long-term interdisciplinary and 
comparative goals, potentially undermining all the efforts to date. However, the use of 
experimental organisms for the investigation of specific questions within well-defined 
contexts is just as important as the use of model organisms for integrative and comparative 
research. Thus there is no scientifically or epistemologically grounded justification for recent 
efforts to transform experimental organisms that are popular within specific disciplines into 
model organisms (the so-called ‘emerging model organisms,’ [6]), although there may be 
good political and economic reasons why researchers wish to do so. For such organisms to 
succeed as model organisms, a range of features would be required that are typically not in 
evidence in such organisms. Distinguishing the specific characteristics of model organism 
work involves recognising that this type of research may be inappropriate for research 
questions or programs where the processes of interest are much more delimited or can be 
usefully studied in isolation [10]. It also is the case that some useful lines of research will be 
neglected if we continue to focus solely on current model organisms. Hence the time has 
come to exploit the resources and knowledge accumulated using model organisms to study 
more diverse groups of organisms.  
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